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Court comes to Pikangikum First Nation through the air. Judges, Crown
attorneys, and defence lawyers fly into this Anishinaabe community, lo-
cated 229 kilometres north of Kenora, Ontario, to hear bail, trial, and
sentencing matters involving members of the community. And then they
fly out. Many of those provincial court proceedings involve sentencing
members of the community to jail in Kenora or to a penitentiary even
further away. We suspect that s. 15 of the Charter is rarely discussed in
the Pikangikum courtroom (which is sometimes a room in the business
development centre and sometimes the Chinese restaurant), a reality that
is not unique to this community or courthouse. The equality rights guar-
anteed by s. 15 of the Charter, in their 35-year history, have had rela-
tively little impact on the many ways that inequality pervades Canadian
sentencing law.1 The promise of s. 15 has largely flown high above the
daily machinations of criminal courts and places of punishment.
However, in R. v. Turtle,2 a provincial court sentencing proceeding for
impaired driving that involved a constitutional challenge brought by six
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
** Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
*** The authors thank a number of colleagues (Gillian Calder, Christina Gray,
Jeffery Hewitt, Jennifer Koshan, Dayna Scott, and Jonnette Watson Hamilton)
who read and provided useful feedback on an earlier draft of this comment. We
have incorporated some of those revisions but due to the tight timeline for publi-
cation, we have had to leave some of the excellent suggestions we received for a
future, longer article on this topic.
1 See, e.g., Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Adverse Impact
of Mandatory Victim Surcharges and the Continuing Disappearance of Section
15 Equality Rights” (January 4, 2019), online: ABlawg, http://ablawg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Blog_JK_JWH_Boudreault_Dec2018.pdf.
2 R. v. Turtle, 2020 CarswellOnt 14248 (Ont. C.J.), reported ante, p. 382.
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Indigenous women (Sherry Turtle, Audrey Turtle, Loretta Turtle, Cher-
ilee Turtle, Rocelyn Moose and Tracey Strang), Canadian substantive
equality touched down in Treaty 5 Territory. The women had all been
convicted of a second impaired driving offence, and were facing
mandatory minimum sentences of not more than 90 days. They were also
eligible under the terms of s. 732 of the Criminal Code to serve these
sentences intermittently. On October 2, 2020, Justice David Gibson held
that “the unavailability of an intermittent sentence to on-reserve mem-
bers of the Pikangikum First Nation, and those similarly situated, for vio-
lation of the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of s. 255 of the
Code, violate[d] s. 15 of the Charter.”3 This infringement of substantive
equality, based on the ground of “Aboriginality-residence” (in this case,
living on-reserve) was not a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter
and, as such, the six applicants were entitled to Charter relief.4 After the
Charter claim was filed and before it was heard, the Crown had under-
taken to make the temporary absence program available to the applicants
(but not to others from the community or elsewhere who faced the same
barriers) and they had also offered, quite extraordinarily, to fly the appli-
cants back and forth to the Kenora jail, at the Crown’s expense, if they
were given intermittent sentences. Calling the Crown’s undertakings
“some questionable legal rope-a-dope,”5 Justice Gibson decided the sub-
stantive Charter claim over the Crown’s objection that it was moot.
The roots of the claim stretch back to a time before Canadian law was
applied in Pikangikum. Early in his reasons, Justice Gibson wrote: “The
question at the heart of this joint application, namely, whether particular
Criminal Code provisions of general application have an unconstitutional
impact on Pikangikum First Nation residents, requires a close look at the
history of the people of Pikangikum, their place in Canadian confedera-
tion and what it means for them to be equal under the law.”6 In finding
3 Turtle, para. 153.
4 As a provincial court judge, Gibson J. did not have jurisdiction to declare the
Code provisions invalid pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. How-
ever provincial court judges do have the power to determine the constitutionality
of a law where it is properly before them since no one can be convicted under an
unconstitutional law: R. v. Lloyd, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130, 27 C.R. (7th) 205
(S.C.C.), R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
5 Turtle, para. 141.
6 Turtle, para. 13.
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that unconstitutional impact, the substance of Justice Gibson’s analysis is
worth a closer look, both to appreciate a rare victory of this kind and to
consider the possible future of the sort of reasoning employed in this case
for challenging the mass incarceration of Indigenous people through s.
15 of the Charter.
The judge was aided by counsel for the women being sentenced, inter-
venors with expertise, including the Pikangikum First Nation and Ab-
original Legal Services, as well as elders and other witnesses with deep
knowledge of the community and the history of Crown-Indigenous rela-
tions in Treaty 5 Territory. Judge Gibson’s decision refuses the doctri-
nally approved separation between Treaty and Charter issues. It chal-
lenges the usual foregrounding of individual responsibility in criminal
matters, instead working to grapple with the Canadian state’s past and
present responsibility for the “corrosive effects of colonization” on the
people of Pikangikum — a responsibility that goes beyond the criminal
legal context of sentencing and incarceration.
The reasons in Turtle do not take refuge in doctrinally neat aspects of the
complex and difficult context of the case. They are much longer, at 36
pages, than one might expect of a provincial court sentencing, and they
contain so much worthy of close attention: the rare and resource-inten-
sive intervention by a First Nation and an Indigenous justice organization
in a provincial court criminal proceeding; the significance of rurality and
remoteness in questions of access to justice; the decision to focus on s.
15 rather than s. 7 or 12 which are generally seen to have more purchase
in the criminal legal context; the voluminous evidence given by current
and former Chiefs of the First Nation, community members and Elders,
various government officials, and a historian of Crown-Indigenous rela-
tions and treaty making to prove the s. 15 claim; and a further claim by
the Pikangikum First Nation that they have a treaty right to work with the
Crown to administer criminal justice in a manner consistent with their
autonomy and laws, along with a corresponding governmental duty to
consult with them, rooted in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the
honour of the Crown.
Our commentary focuses on the way the s. 15 claim is dealt with,
through the doctrinal requirements of a ground of discrimination, a dis-
tinction made, and substantive discrimination, although this discussion
engages tangentially with many of the issues raised above. This case
reveals important connections between and among sentencing practice,
the equality provisions of the Charter, and treaty relationships. We con-
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clude that this case is important for the way it identifies ongoing Crown
obligations in respect of criminal justice in First Nations communities,
obligations that are not met by the quick fixes offered here, nor to a great
extent by the regime set up by s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and
Gladue.7
Reversing the Gaze
Indigenous commentators have noted the appetite of settler audiences for
narratives of Indigenous trauma and brokenness.8 These approaches,
writes Eve Tuck, work “. . . from a theory of change that establishes
harm or injury in order to achieve reparation” — and “[i]n many ways,
the underlying theory of change is borrowed from litigation discourse.”9
Tuck’s antidote is “researching for desire,”10 an approach which would
both centre “wisdom and hope” in communities and insist on exposing
not burying “ongoing structural inequity”.11 Cases like Turtle obviously
engage in some of this damage discourse. For example, Justice Gibson
cites the 2012 Maclean’s article which named Pikangikum the “suicide
capital of the world” in a story about the heartbreakingly high suicide
rates and clusters of suicides, including amongst children under 13. Gib-
son J. uses the citation in support of his view that the government’s fail-
ure to honour the Treaty provisions about alcohol have been a key part of
the trauma that the community, families and people of Pikangikum have
experienced since about the 1960s. Nevertheless, the level of harm and
7 For discussion of the way that Gladue sentencing practices may fail to advance
the objective of decarceration of Indigenous people, see Marie-Eve Sylvestre &
Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau, “Ipeelee and the Duty to Resist” (2018) 51(2)
UBC Law Review 548. The authors reviewed 655 post-Ipeelee sentencing deci-
sions involving s. 718.2(e) and concluding that the section has had limited im-
pact, largely due to a general “resistance by the legal system to pluralism and a
challenge to the monopoly of the Canadian State in matters of punishment” at
553-554.
8 Eve Tuck, “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities,” (2009) 79
Harvard Educational Review 409. Online: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~rfrank/class_
web/ES-114A/Week%204/TuckHEdR79-3.pdf
9 Tuck, ibid, 413.
10 Tuck, ibid, 416.
11 Tuck, ibid, 417.
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trauma in such a naming is so shockingly high that it may overshadow
the way the information is used in support of an argument about struc-
tural inequity and the need to work in harmony with the considerable and
unique strengths of this community.
On the whole, the reasons of Justice Gibson do better than many others
in the sentencing realm, where a damage narrative dominates, and rea-
sons never transcend a framework of individual responsibility, never re-
ally pursue the structural, settler-colonial context, and never attend to
what community members think, believe, understand and want. Justice
Gibson’s insistence that the next phase be consultative, both in the micro
(sentencing for the Turtle defendants involving the community’s elders
as well as Chief and Council) and macro (between the federal govern-
ment and Treaty 5 nations about broken treaty promises and future gov-
ernance of criminal justice), recognize the self-determination and laws of
the community of Pikangikum. In a variety of ways, Justice Gibson was
convinced by the community and the lawyering to move beyond a dis-
course of crisis around Indigenous mass incarceration.
Efrat Arbel has argued that using the language of “crisis” in cases like
Gladue and Ipeelee fails to “meaningfully assign legal responsibility for
the ‘crisis,’ and instead, disperse[s] responsibility for its production.”12
Drawing on the notion of constitutional ordering in Gordon Christie’s
scholarship,13 Arbel contends that describing Indigenous mass incarcera-
tion as a crisis, without meaningfully identifying state responsibility for
that state of affairs, results in “deepening and strengthening Canada’s co-
lonial narrative. The effect is to distance, and even disappear legal re-
sponsibility for ongoing colonial violence,”14 thereby failing to disrupt
the conditions and processes that produce Indigenous mass incarceration.
Commenting on the Turtle decision, defence counsel John Bilton de-
scribed the court’s approach as “reversing the gaze on the justice sys-
tem,” noting that he borrowed the phrase from Cree artist Kent
12 Efrat Arbel, “Rethinking the ‘Crisis’ of Indigenous Mass Imprisonment”
(2019) 34(3) Canadian Journal of Law & Society 437 at 439.
13 Gordon Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow,
Delgamuukw, and Haida Nation,” (2003) 23(1) Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 17.
14 Arbel, supra note 12 at 439.
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Monkman.15 Bilton says that “[i]nstead of looking at the suffering [in
Pikangikum] that we are attempting to solve and failing miserably, we
should consider that what we are observing are the symptoms of our own
disorder.” The lengthy decision in Turtle succeeds in reversing, even mo-
mentarily, the colonial legal system’s gaze, normally focused on indivi-
dual responsibility or brokenness. In Justice Gibson’s view, overincarcer-
ation of Indigenous people should not be the focus: “the issue is not
overincarceration, per se, but rather the direct extension of the corrosive
effects of colonialization.”16 Analyzing equality in this context requires
engagement with the failure of government actors to fulfill treaty obliga-
tions to the people of Pikangikum while bringing the full force of the
criminal law down on them, locking up community members in shocking
numbers,17 and denying them access to the intermittent sentence regime
which mitigates some of that harshness for others subject to those
punishments.
Section 15: Grounding the Claim
Turtle is superficially somewhat similar to R. v. Sharma,18 a recent suc-
cessful s. 15 claim at the Ontario Court of Appeal. Both use s. 15 of the
15 Jody Porter, “Duty to consult extends to administration of justice in First
Nations, lawyer says,” CBC News (9 October 2020), online: https://www.cbc.
ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/pikangikum-court-ruling-1.5756075. See also
Katherine Brooks, “Kent Monkman, Aka Miss Chief Eagle Testickle, Confronts
Native American Myths,” HuffPost US (21 May 2014), online: https://www.huf-
fingtonpost.ca/entry/kent-monkman_n_5360583?ri18n=true (where Monkman
describes how he inserts a fictional, gender-bending character, Miss Chief Tes-
tickle, in his paintings to “reverse the gaze. She looks back at European
settlers.”)
16 Turtle, para. 100.
17 Ninety-four percent of the people incarcerated in the Kenora District Jail are
Indigenous people from communities such as Pikangikum. (Turtle, para. 102.)
According to records of the Ontario Provincial Police, between January 1 and
March 4, 2019, there were 600 individual lock-ups in Pikangikum and 1,450
calls for service from a population of 3,200 people. (Turtle, para. 87.)
18 R. v. Sharma, 2020 ONCA 478, 65 C.R. (7th) 1 (Ont. C.A.). In Sharma, the
successful challenge to ss. 742.1(c) and 7421(e)(ii) preclusions of conditional
sentences was analysed as a case in which adverse effects were created on the
basis of “race” for Aboriginal people thus “undermin[ing] the purpose and reme-
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Charter against the grim requirements of sentencing and its impact on
Indigenous peoples, and both are adverse impact cases, but the details of
the claims are quite different, as are the decisions. The core of the claim
in Turtle is about the authorization of intermittent sentences in s. 732 of
the Criminal Code. Unlike Sharma, in which the adverse effects claim
was built on the ground of race, the claim in Turtle is refers to a specific
place, and a specific people.
To make out a violation of s. 15, claimants must demonstrate that the law
or action “on its face or in its impact, creates a distinction based on enu-
merated or analogous grounds; and imposes burdens or denies a benefit
in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbat-
ing disadvantage.”19 Turtle is a claim about the disproportionate impact
of “a seemingly neutral law . . . on members of groups protected on the
basis of an enumerated or analogous ground.”20 Adverse effects discrim-
ination has long been recognized under s. 15(1) of the Charter, but the
most recent case from the Supreme Court, Fraser (released just 14 days
after Turtle) provides some helpful clarity on the required evidentiary
bases for such claims — and also reveals a rather nasty split on the Su-
preme Court on these precise questions.21 If anything, Fraser bolsters
the reasoning in Turtle, at least in terms of evidence and adverse impact
claims.
In Turtle, the basic s. 15 claim is that people like the claimants who live
on the reserve at Pikangikum are disproportionately denied access to the
benefits of s. 732 of the Criminal Code which authorizes intermittent
sentences. It was agreed amongst the parties that “it is financially and
logistically prohibitive” for these defendants “to travel to and from [Ke-
dial effect of s. 718.2(e) in addressing the substantive inequality between Ab-
original and non-Aboriginal people manifested in overincarceration within the
criminal justice system. . . .” (para. 79). For commentary on Sharma, see Benja-
min Ralston, “R v. Sharma: Addressing Systemic Discrimination in the Criminal
Justice System” ante, p. 367; Patricia Barkaskas & Emma Cunliffe, “Too many
Indigenous women are in prison — but sentencing flexibility will help (Opin-
ion)” Macleans (Online) (June 7, 2018), online: <https://www.macleans.ca/opin-
ion/too-many-indigenous-women-are-in-prison-but-sentencing-flexibility-will-
help/>.
19 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) at para. 27.
20 Fraser, ibid, para. 30, citations omitted.
21 Fraser, ibid, paras. 56–75.
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nora], from weekend to weekend, at their own expense, to serve out their
sentence.”22
The ground of discrimination analysis in Turtle is rather tricky. Rather
than rely on race or engage in an effort to establish a new analogous
ground, the claim rests on Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian &
Northern Affairs),23 in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that
“whether an Aboriginal band member lives on or off the reserve” is an
analogous ground. In Corbiere, the successful claimants were members
of the Batchewana First Nation living off the reserve. They argued that s.
77(1) of the Indian Act, which required that band members be “ordinarily
resident” on the reserve to vote in band elections, violated s. 15 of the
Charter. The court held that “Aboriginality-residence” (in that case, off-
reserve band member status) was a new analogous ground. As the
grounds cases generally have concluded, analogous grounds will “always
stand as a constant marker of potential legislative discrimination.”24
The challenge for the Turtle defendants, of course, is that they are on the
other side of “Aboriginality-residence” from the claimants in Corbiere.
While Corbiere is silent on this issue (the leading reasons on grounds
explicitly declined to decide whether being resident on reserve would
also meet the grounds requirement),25 the more recent Court decision in
Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat26 suggested that evidence and
argument would be required to establish on-reserve status as a ground.27
22 Turtle, para. 4.
23 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.).
24 Corbiere, ibid, para. 10.
25 Corbiere, ibid, para. 62 per L’Heureux-Dubé J., (“‘off-reserve band member
status’ is an analogous ground. It will hereafter be recognized as an analogous
ground in any future case involving this combination of traits. I note that in
making this determination, I make no findings about “residence” as an analo-
gous ground in contexts other than as it affects band members who do not live
on the reserve of the band to which they belong.”).
26 [2015] 2 S.C.R. 548 (S.C.C.).
27 Kahkewistahaw, ibid, paras. 10–14, 26. The grounds analysis in Kahkewis-
tahaw, which challenged an educational attainment requirement for election to
Band Council positions, is quite complex, in part because of the way the case
was argued. At trial, the claimant argued that “educational attainment” was anal-
ogous to race and age. He lost. On appeal, he argued that “residential school
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Turtle takes up that challenge. Provided with considerable evidence
about “the history of the Pikangikum First Nation and its place in Cana-
dian Confederation,”28 Justice Gibson decided that on-reserve residence”
is also a “constant marker” of potential discrimination.29
After considering the evidence, Gibson J. speculated that Canadian con-
stitutional text and the facts would support bringing the s. 15 claim on
the enumerated ground, of “national . . . origin”.30 But because he had
not heard “full argument” on that point, he decided he was “satisfied that,
at a minimum, the Applicants have established they fall with [sic] an
analogous ground category for the purposes of my current analysis.”31
Closer to the end of the decision, he seemed to use the Treaty to define
the people affected: “The legal regime I have been asked to consider in
this application, though neutral on its face, treats the people of Treaty #5
as second-class citizens.”32
The distinction required to meet a second key part of the s. 15 test is
relatively quickly dealt with “. . . being deprived of the opportunity to
serve a jail sentence intermittently because of their status as on-reserve
band members of the Pikangikum First Nation, constitutes the depriva-
tion of a legal benefit . . . [and] creates a distinction in law between
survivors without a Grade 12 education” were an analogous group, but the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal found that the relevant grounds were “age” and “residence
on a reserve.” At the Supreme Court, he argued that the group was “older com-
munity members who live on a reserve.” The Supreme Court concluded there
was “virtually no evidence” about the relationship between age, residency on a
reserve and education levels in the particular community.
28 Turtle, para. 30.
29 Corbiere, supra, note 23, para. 8 (“The enumerated and analogous grounds
stand as constant markers of suspect decision making or potential
discrimination”).
30 This confirms that there are highly undertheorized but important issues
around the different ways that Indigenous identity and/or status is understood,
experienced, and translated in anti-discrimination claims. See, e.g., Sharma,
supra, note 18.
31 Turtle, para. 58. We do not read this line as suggesting that Gibson J. was
confining his “analogous ground” decision to this case only, although others
may disagree. As Corbiere suggests, analogous grounds are permanent markers.
32 Turtle, para. 126
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themselves and other members of the general public.”33 As in Sharma,
the Crown had taken the position that there was no distinction created by
the intermittent sentence regime. Rather, there was “general discrimina-
tion.”34 The Supreme Court has now, in Fraser, said more about what is
required to illustrate a “distinction.”35
The Treaty Context of Discrimination: “an enduring relationship
based on solemn promises”
At least part of what makes the decision unique and important is the cen-
trality of Treaty 5 to establishing this discrimination claim. The most ob-
vious relationship between ss. 35 and 15 would be in the text of s. 25 of
the Charter, a little-used section which guarantees that the Charter rights
will not be “construed so as to abrogate or derogate from, [inter alia] . . .,
treaty rights.36 Turtle offers a new way of thinking about how treaties
might play a role in Charter analyses. The attachment of the people of
Pikangikum to their land, the content and meaning of Treaty 5, and the
erosion of many social structures through deliberate interventions of set-
tler peoples and the Canadian state, including those structures that deal
with wrong-doing and harm in the community, are critical pieces of the
legal and factual context of this discrimination claim.37 This is especially
so in the last stage of s. 15, the discrimination analysis.
The evidence of historical and ongoing disadvantage in this case is over-
whelming. Indigenous people living on this remote reserve live lives
marked by some of the most harmful effects of colonization, disposses-
sion, deprivation, and criminalization. The litany of colonial harms ex-
perienced by Indigenous people are commonly cited in Gladue sentenc-
ing cases where the ultimate question is supposed to be a fit sentence for
the individual before the court. Crucially, in Turtle the judge refuses to
separate this context from the operation of the sentencing regime itself,
33 Turtle, para. 59.
34 Turtle, para. 63.
35 Fraser, supra note 19 at paras. 41–52.
36 Among the relatively rare treatments of this provision is Justice Bastrarache’s
decision in R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, 58 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) (concurring
in the result but writing for himself on s. 25).
37 Turtle, paras. 35–56.
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despite the suggestion of the Crown.38 The reasons rely substantially on
the fact of a Treaty relationship between Canada and the people of
Pikangikum. Justice Gibson interprets the responsibility of the Canadian
state, therefore, not only through s. 15 and the Criminal Code, but also
through the Treaty. He writes, based on the testimony of the Chief at
Pikangikum, Dean Owen; Mr. Lloyd Comber (a band member from Lit-
tle Grand Rapids First Nation); Dr. Janet Armstrong (an expert in
Crown-Indigenous history and treaty making) and others that the Treaty
was understood by the Anishinaabe signatories as “an agreement for mu-
tual assistance.” However, the Treaty relationship has deteriorated into
“an exercise in the crudest form of colonization.”39 The refusal of the
government to “fulfil its solemn treaty promise to assist”40 is part of the
finding of discrimination.
Gibson J.’s description of the effects of colonization focuses in two main
areas. First is the replacement of traditional lifestyles with “depen-
dency”41 through deliberate efforts to replace Anishinaabe religious
practices with Christianity,42 resource competition and depletion through
settler behaviours,43 the removal of children to residential schools, “child
welfare programs and social assistance payment.”44 Second is the devel-
opment of widespread abuse of alcohol and other addictive substances on
the reserve since the 1960s.45
Treaty 5 includes a promise from Canada that “. . . all laws now in force,
or hereafter to be enacted, to preserve Her Indian subjects inhabiting the
reserves, or living elsewhere within Her North-west Territories, from the
evil influence of the use of intoxicating liquors, shall be strictly en-
forced.”46 The historical evidence presented in the case establishes that
the Indigenous signatories were concerned that intoxicants posed harm to
38 Turtle, para. 63.
39 Turtle, para. 97.
40 Turtle, para. 99.
41 This word is repeatedly used, see Turtle, paras. 80, 85, 99.
42 Turtle, paras. 74–78.
43 Turtle, paras. 79.
44 Turtle, paras. 80, 99.
45 Turtle 82.
46 Cited in Turtle, para. 88.
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the community. Justice Gibson notes that “the effects of alcohol abuse in
Pikangikum are rampant and have become devastating,”47 notwithstand-
ing attempts by the First Nation to keep alcohol out of the community.
But the federal government has not provided assistance. Testimony in the
case indicated that the local Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) did not
know the details of the relevant bylaw about alcohol. The Federal
Crown, who would have to prosecute any charges laid under the bylaw,
did not participate at all in the proceedings. Justice Gibson’s subsequent
comments on this issue are sharp: “. . . the Crown very clearly is neglect-
ing its treaty obligations by not to [sic] enforcing the laws restricting the
use of alcohol in Pikangikum as it promised to do by the terms of Treaty
#5. This neglect has had direct and catastrophic consequences for the
people of Pikangikum.”
Another link with the treaty context and state responsibility is made
through recognizing that all of the women being sentenced in this case
were mothers, primary caregivers to young children. The context here is
stark. Seventy-five per cent of the population of Pikangikum is under 25.
One of the women, Tracy Strang, was caring not only for her five chil-
dren, but also her sister’s four children. The s. 15 discrimination analysis
incorporates an understanding of the profound and harmful impact of the
incarceration of Indigenous women on their children, and the long his-
tory of family separation which has so defined the Canadian state’s rela-
tionship to Indigenous peoples, and been the cause of so many different
forms of loss.48 After noting that “removing mothers from their children
47 Turtle, para. 90.
48 The rights of children are not independently argued here but that is an addi-
tional layer and potential for future s. 15 or other Charter arguments. Canadian
courts have, on the whole, paid little attention to the rights and well-being of
children in sentencing their parents. See Canadian Friends Service Committee,
Considering the Best Interests of the Child When Sentencing Parents in Canada
(December 2018), online: https://quakerservice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
Considering-the-Best-Interests-of-the-Child-when-Sentencing-Parents-in-Can-
ada.pdf. However, a recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision provides
a rare example of taking these interests seriously, particularly in the context of
Indigenous families and the intergenerational impacts of colonial dispossession,
residential schools, and child welfare interventions. In Sheck v. Canada
(Minister of Justice), 2019 BCCA 364 (B.C. C.A.) a majority of the British Co-
lumbia Court of Appeal allowed a judicial review application of an extradition
decision made in respect of an Indigenous man. Justice Griffin held that, in con-
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for extended periods of time will undoubtably exacerbate existing
problems in this vulnerable and destabilized First Nation,”49 Justice Gib-
son stated, “it is very hard not to notice the grotesque similarities be-
tween these kinds of ‘correctional institutions’ and residential schools
that have caused such lasting damage to indigenous communities.”50
The focus on the Treaty relationship limits the ways that Turtle raises the
possibility of challenges on behalf of all “rural Canadians . . . located
great distances from the closest correctional facility,”51 or perhaps more
narrowly rural mothers. This concern was clearly on the mind of the
judge and hence the parties in argument.52 However, the way the s. 15
claim is analyzed through particular attention to the Treaty history and
contemporary realities of Pikangikum may eliminate any easy effort to
analogize.53 The reasoning in Turtle is based on much more than dis-
tance. Likewise, the way that Justice Gibson dealt with the s. 12 claim
seems to foreclose using Turtle for such arguments. He states that “the
discrimination against the Applicants is cruel, in the colloquial sense, but
I am not satisfied it constitutes a stand-alone s. 12 violation in the sense
that the punishment is grossly disproportionate. If that were so, indepen-
dent of the inequality claim, this claim could be advanced by any rural
Canadian unable to serve an intermittent sentence.”54 It seems that Turtle
sidering the personal circumstances of Mr. Sheck and his children, the Minister
failed to consider their Indigenous heritage and the context of the historical mis-
treatment by Canada of Indigenous families which forcibly separated children
from their parents and culture, which were relevant factors in light of the much
more severe sentence Mr. Sheck faced in the US if convicted.
49 Turtle, para. 100.
50 Turtle, para. 104.
51 Turtle, para. 8.
52 See especially Turtle, paras. 8, 151. The question of other rural Canadians in
these arguments is raised at the beginning and the end of the written reasons.
53 There is no s. 15 case law directly on point. The Supreme Court case law has
either directly rejected these grounds as in “geographic residence” in R. v. Tur-
pin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 69 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) or, at least, not accepted
them yet as in “family status” which was part of the claim in Fraser.
54 Turtle, para. 151.
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does not directly advance s. 12 arguments based on difficulty of access to
less burdensome sentencing options due to distance and cost of travel.55
In the conclusion of the s. 15 analysis, the way the Treaty has figured as
a key part of the context in which discrimination is occurring is clear:
“where the Pikangikum people’s traditional lifestyle has been disrupted
. . . while the government refuses to fulfil its solemn treaty promise to
assist, any legal regime of that government that has the effect of ex-
tending the damaging effects of colonialization, will be wrongfully
discriminatory.”56
After establishing the violation of s. 15, (and as is quite common in these
cases) Justice Gibson’s s. 1 analysis is cursory at best, consisting of three
paragraphs. He relies substantially on Sharma to find (inter alia) that the
Crown cannot meet the minimal impairment requirement because of the
way the mandatory minimum deprives the sentencing court of options.57
The way that the s. 15 analysis in Turtle is built around an understanding
of Treaty 5 appears unique in s. 15. Much more familiar is the usual
doctrinal siloing of the Charter and the provisions of s. 35 of the Consti-
tution. But there is a doctrinal soundness to the way Turtle puts them
together inside the substantive equality analysis at s. 15. In the same way
that s. 15 equality “values”, but not doctrinal requirements, have been
influential in a number of cases involving Criminal Code provisions,58
55 See also R. v. Black, 2018 ONSC 1430 (Ont. S.C.J.) in which the lead lawyer
for the first claimants in Turtle, John Bilton (joined by the Nishnawbe-Aski Le-
gal Services Corporation as intervener) tried but failed to preserve the decision
of a sentencing judge that a Pikangikum resident could serve his sentence in the
local lockup. The appeal was allowed.
56 Turtle, para. 99 (the use of the word “wrongfully” here seems designed to
respond to Justice Miller’s dissent in Sharma, in which he uses the word wrong-
ful repeatedly and argues that the Supreme Court of Canada decision Kahkewis-
tahaw is contrary to Andrews and wrong: Sharma, para. 189 (per Miller J., dis-
senting). Justice Miller’s alarm about the implications of Canada’s adverse
effects doctrine is significantly echoed by the dissenting justices in Fraser.
However, the split between the dissent and majority decision in Fraser could not
be clearer. Justice Miller’s views as expressed in Sharma have not carried the
day in the Supreme Court’s latest s. 15 case.
57 Turtle, para. 108.
58 Hogg, Peter W, “Equality As a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion” (2003) The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
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this case reveals possibilities for the way that treaties between the Crown
and First Nations create a particular relationship between the parties
which become a critical part of the context of their other (legal)
encounters.
Of Quick Fixes, Limits and Next Moves
The response of the provincial Crown to the Turtle claim demonstrates
the energy and resources Canadian government actors will expend to
avoid a finding of even partial state responsibility for Indigenous mass
incarceration. The court refused to allow the Crown’s quick fix for the
Turtle claimants — one-off access to the temporary absence regime or
shuttling these women back and forth to the Kenora jail at the Crown’s
expense — to derail a substantive inquiry into the merits of the claim,
noting that “the need for an ad hoc ‘work around’, in my view, is one of
the hallmarks of an unconstitutional legal regime.”59 The concrete result
in Turtle was contained, in part due to the limited jurisdiction of the pro-
vincial court judge, but perhaps the Crown could see the potential impact
of a successful s. 15 challenge based in these facts and reasoning. The
spectre of a slippery slope to invalidating a whole range of sentencing
(and other criminal) laws loomed large for Justice Miller in dissent in
Sharma and seemingly for the Crown in Turtle. It is a common response
to adverse impact claims. But rather than acceding to the Crown’s “noth-
ing to see here” approach, the decision in Turtle makes room for a mean-
ingful substantive equality inquiry, locating significant responsibility for
systemic discrimination (too often assigned to Indigenous individuals as
“Gladue factors”) with the state. The criminal law is so relentlessly indi-
vidualizing. Constitutional claims like this one provide a wedge to crack
those assumptions open, to momentarily reverse our gaze toward the sys-
temic, the structural, and the community.
In Turtle, Justice Gibson decided that his obligation in sentencing the
defendants was to “harmonize our approaches to sentencing with tradi-
tional understandings of justice.”60 He committed to a process of consul-
tation with elders around a fit sentence. He declined the request of the
Cases Conference 20, online: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/
vol20/iss1/5.
59 Turtle, para. 139.
60 Turtle, para. 110.
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intervener Pikangikum to “make a declaration that the Government of
Canada has an obligation, pursuant to Treaty #5, to consult deeply with
the community about the way justice generally is administered in its
community”61 (on the basis that issues about treaty interpretation require
a proper forum and full participation by all parties). He nevertheless con-
cluded that, obligation or not, it is in the Crown’s best interests to consult
deeply with the Pikangikum Nation.
Shortly after the decision, Grand Chief Alvin Fiddler, of Nishnawbe Aski
Nation (an umbrella organization representing 49 First Nations in James
Bay Treaty No. 9 and the Ontario portion of Treaty No. 5), said in a press
release: “I urge the Crown to not waste time by seeking an appeal and
seize this opportunity to transform the administration of justice.”62 He
told a reporter: “I would ask that the province . . . acknowledge, recog-
nize what this means and to reach out to communities like Pikangikum or
NAN to begin the process on how we can fix this . . . We need to do it
quickly.”63 The irony of the word quickly in this context will not have
been lost on the Grand Chief.
Conclusion: Not a Crisis but a Failed System
The decision in Turtle was read out in the Kenora Courthouse on October
2, 2020. The 36-page opinion took almost all day to read out, in part
because it was read in both English and Anishinaabemowin (a language
fluently spoken by most Pikangikum residents). The claim in Turtle, and
the decision which validates so much of it, represent yet another call to
recognize the ongoing harms and injustices of colonialization, and to
remedy these through greater recognition of Indigenous self-determina-
tion and the value of Indigenous legal orders. These calls are not new,
61 Turtle, para. 112.
62 Nishnawbe Aski Nation, (Press Release) “Landmark Decision in Pikangikum
Constitutional Challenge Shows Need for Justice Transformation,” (October 5,
2020) online: <https://www.nan.ca/news/landmark-decision-in-pikangikum-con-
stitutional-challenge-shows-need-for-justice-transformation/>.
63 Shari Narine, “Ruling on intermittent sentencing for remote First Nations
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and they are not rare. What is meaningful about Turtle is the way that it
places state failures and Indigenous nationhood at the heart of the issue.
The state failures here take centre stage, and there are many, from broad
policy decisions, to neglect, right down to the Crown’s approach to the
litigation. Through this framing, the decision avoids, as Arbel suggests
we should, discourse about a crisis of overincarceration and it fore-
grounds, as Tuck indicates we must, broad state held responsibility for
present structural conditions. Arguably, the focus on Indigenous self-de-
termination as a route to justice has also mitigated some of the ways in
which litigation demands narratives of community damage.
We do not wish to overstate the potential of this one decision to provide
a meaningful remedy for the deep injustices at the heart of the claim.
Another read of Turtle would see the decision as just one in a long line of
recent efforts by settlers and their institutions to redeem themselves
through telling these stories and making pronouncements. On this ac-
count, Turtle should not be seen as a shining example of how Canadian
law can turn on itself, bringing transformative change in and through its
own doctrines. Instead, it would be a reminder to maintain a critical eye
on the claims made about Canadian law and the ways it continues to
subordinate and pathologize Indigenous communities while glamouriz-
ing, comforting and centering non-Indigenous institutions and actors.
Jody Porter and Hayden King have both written about this possibility in
relation to the recent rediscovery of the story of Chanie Wenjack, an An-
ishinaabe boy who escaped from residential school and died attempting
to make the long journey home.64 Many will know this project,
spearheaded by Gord Downie, the late lead singer of the popular band
The Tragically Hip, under the title “The Secret Path.”65 This project,
writes Dr. King, “. . .reflected a sense of self-importance, which betrayed
the spirit of much that came before it. The decision to determine and
articulate what is said and is not reconciliation belongs to survivors.”66
64 Jody Porter, “Pathfinding” (October 20, 2020), online: Maison-
neuve<https://maisonneuve.org/article/2020/10/20/pathfinding/>.
65 See www.secretpath.ca.
66 Hayden King, “The Secret Path, Reconciliation & Not-Reconciliation” (Octo-
ber 19, 2016), online: <https://biidwewidam.com/2016/10/19/the-secret-path-
reconciliation-not-reconciliation/>.
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Mindful of this caution, we think it is worth noticing a decision like Tur-
tle and reflecting on the potential of its analysis and approach. The s. 15
analysis in Turtle is generally consistent with the most recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Fraser. The use of the Treaty and the obli-
gations it creates as part of the contextual analysis of discrimination is
more novel but not contrary to existing doctrines. And it seems at least
possible that this decision will not be appealed, so that beyond the sen-
tencing outcome for the claimants, we are now waiting to see whether
the Nishnawbe Aski Nation and Pikangikum will be consulted about how
criminal justice could be meaningfully done in Treaty 5 communities.
Cases like Turtle offer communities and lawyers new arguments. They
remind Crown attorneys not to impede efforts to have important issues
litigated. They raise important questions about the forms of equality pro-
vided in our criminal justice system. By bringing legal logics to specific
places, people and histories, cases like this force these abstractions into
new configurations capable of mapping onto the particular contours of
the spaces in which they land.
